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BIANNUAL SURVEY
be seeking to reach wages not yet paid. It was, for that reason,
found barred by federal prohibition. Shall the income execution
still be so barred, though it seeks wages in the hands of the
judgment debtor himself, rather than in the hands of the employer?
Priorities in judgment debtor's personalty where section 5234 is
inapplicable.
In re Goldberg 243 was a proceeding to determine the priorities
among several creditors in an award the judgment debtor had
received in the court of claims. The amount of the award had
been deposited in a bank by the state comptroller and was to be
paid out pursuant to the direction of the supreme court. The
State of New York and the City of New York both claimed a
priority in the fund as against various judgment creditors on the
ground that the sovereign had a common-law priority for taxes
which had become due prior to the service of subpoenas by the
other judgment creditors. Faden Paper Corp. and H. Wool &
Sons, judgment creditors, argued that they were entitled to priority
in the award because they had served third-party subpoenas 244
and restraining orders 245 upon the comptroller prior to service
by any of the other creditors.
Justice Koreman, relying on well-established case law,2' 6
held that the state and city were entitled to the common-law
priority of a sovereign. With respect to the private judgment
creditors, Faden Paper Corp. and H. Wool & Sons, the court
held them entitled to priority as against other judgment creditors,
since they had served their third-party subpoenas prior to the
other judgment creditors.
The priorities as among judgment creditors found in CPLR
5234 were inapplicable in the instant case. That section only
applies when an execution is delivered to the sheriff or when orders
under article 52 are filed.2 4 7  Since there is no provision in the
CPLR to cover the situation presented in the instant case,
the court had to rely on common-law principles to establish
priorities. The court adopted a "first in time" approach, in that
the judgment creditor who first served his subpoena was given
priority over a private judgment creditor who subsequently served
a subpoena. Such a method rewards the diligent creditor. One
may argue, however, that since the CPLR does not provide for
24343 Misc. 2d 1037, 252 N.Y.S2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
24 CPLR 5224.
245 CPLR 5222.
2- E.g., Matter of Brown Printing Co., 285 N.Y. 47, 32 N.E.2d 787 (1941);
Matter of Atlas Television Co., 273 N.Y. 51, 6 N.E2d 94 (1936); City of
New York v. Leibowitz, 5 Misc. 2d 1033, 138 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct 1955).
247See 6 WEmsmN, KoRN & MmLER, NE W YoR CiVI. PRAccE ff 5234.17(1964).
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any priorities in the above situation the court should have permitted
all of the judgment creditors to share pro rata (after the state
and city claims were satisfied). There is something to be said
for either disposition. CPLR 5234 might be reconsidered with
an eye towards giving priority status to judgment creditors who
serve subpoenas or restraining notices under article 52.
ARTICLE 55 - APPEALS GENERALLY
Motion to dismiss for failure to diligently prosecute an appeal-
Indication that courts are becoming stricter.
In Tonkonogy v. Jaffin,24s a motion was made to dismiss
appeals taken from orders dismissing a complaint for insufficiency
and a judgment entered thereon. The notices of appeal were
served in December 1963. The motion to dismiss was made in
May 1964 on the ground that the appellants had not taken any
steps to perfect the appeals. The appellate division, first department,
granted the motion, holding that an undue delay in the perfection
of an appeal tends to frustrate the rights of the respondent and
that the rules 249 pertaining to the time limitations for perfecting
an appeal are not to be lightly regarded. The court pointed out
that a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court and stated the requirements
that the appellant, in opposing such a motion, must show that the
appeal has merit and that there is a satisfactory excuse for his
failure to perfect the appeal.
An analogy may be drawn between the instant case and the
case of Sortino v. Fisher.2 50  Sortino involved a motion to dismiss
for failure to prosecute the action (as opposed to an appeal).
The appellate division, first department, reversed the order of the
lower court which had denied the motion, holding that the delay
was substantial and unreasonable.2 5 1 It further pointed out that an
excuse based on the plaintiff's attorney's press of business would
be rejected. This argument was also advanced in Tonkonogy,
and was rejected, along with the excuse that the appellants lacked
funds with which to prosecute the appeal. The court disposed
of -the latter excuse by pointing out that a person who lacks
24821 App. Div. 2d 264, 249 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st Dep't 1964).
249 CPLR 5530. There are rules in each of the four departments. N.Y.
APi. Div. RR. V. XI, XII, XIII (2), pt. 1 (1st Dep't 1963) are specifically
involved in this case.
25020 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963).
A scholarly discussion of the Sortino case is available in 38 ST. JoHiN's
L. REv. 448-52(1964).
251 The sting has been taken out of the Sortino case by the amendment
of CPLR 3216 by the legislature in 1964. See 38 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 406,
461-63 (1964).
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